Accident of May 17th 1929
On May 17, a telephone message was received at the colliery office that one of the colliery deputies, Richard Lowes, had been injured during blasting operations underground; explosive had blown out some stone before Lowes got clear.
Robert Glendenning, an over-man, at once went down the pit and, having collected Baker and another man, James Purvis, at the bottom of the mineshaft, set off in search of Lowes. The three were soon joined by two hewers, John Kenny and Samuel Hughiff.
All five men - Glendenning, Baker, Hughiff, Kenny and Purvis - were awarded the Edward Medal (for which George Crosses were substituted in 1971). They had, as the citation for the awards declared "knowingly and repeatedly risked their lives in determined and sustained efforts to save the lives of their fellows, and there is no doubt that but for their courageous action the death-toll would have been heavier than it was".
(Source: The Telegraph, December 12th 2000 - The Guardian, February 28th 2001)
(Source: The Telegraph, December 12th 2000 - The Guardian, February 28th 2001)
A detailed account of this accident which claimed the life of three men can be read in an extract from the 1929 Mines Inspectors Report below.
(Source: Durham Mining Museum)
Date: 17th May 1929
Colliery: South Garesfield
Cause: Carbon monoxide poisoning after shot firing
Lives Lost: 3
Colliery: South Garesfield
Cause: Carbon monoxide poisoning after shot firing
Lives Lost: 3
Owing to inadequate ventilation, a comparatively simple accident had tragic results at South Garesfield Colliery, Durham, causing the loss of three lives. Had it not been for the splendid and praiseworthy conduct of a number of rescue parties the death roll would have been much heavier.
The scene of the accident was in the 6th West District of the Victoria Seam situated about 1½ miles inbye the entrances to the mine. The Victoria Seam was about 1ft. 4ins. thick with a blue metal roof and a hard fireclay floor. The seam was worked on the bord and pillar system with pillars 33 by 22 yard centres.
The coal was hand got with the aid of explosives and 6 yards of coal won out as the bords and walls advanced in the solid. The tub roads were carried forward by blasting up about 2ft. 6ins. of the bottom canch for a width of about 5ft. The roof was not shot down.
Open lights were in use throughout the mine, firedamp being unknown. The explosive used for blasting in coal and canches was Arctic Gelignite No. 2 fired with gutta percha fuse and No, 6 detonators.
For some considerable time before the accident no artificial means were used for ventilating the workings. The intakes were by means of drifts, the return being the Lintz Anna shaft. The difference in level between the drift entrances and shaft top was about 500 feet. Investigation following the accident showed that very little air was circulating in the mine; anemometer readings could not be obtained in the main intake airway and smoke tests indicated that the air was nearly stagnant. A ventilating fan was put into use at the Lintz Anna shaft after the accident.
One shift only per day was worked, the workmen leaving the surface at 8 a.m., returning at about 3.30 p.m.
On the day of the accident a deputy had examined the 6th West District before the workmen entered it; he also made another inspection during the shift. At about 1 p.m. another deputy named Richard Lowes, who also acted as shotfirer, took charge of the district, his duties being to see all persons out and then to fire shots. No shots were fired during the working shift.
After the men had left the district on the afternoon of the accident Lowes, accompanied by a lad named Herbert Bailey, (14 years of age), commenced to fire shots at the return end of the district and at about 4 p.m. he reached the 2nd inside left headways... At the face of the headways (or wall) two shotholes in the coal were ready for firing and in the inside bord off the headways — one hole in the coal and another in the bottom canch. The holes were thought to be about 6ft. deep and although there was no evidence to show exactly how much explosive was used, it appears to have been customary to put about one pound in each hole.
When the four shots were ready for firing the lad Bailey — acting upon instructions from Lowes — proceeded to the 6th west going bord to take shelter — near A (see sketch). Bailey said he heard the four shots explode and afterwards waited about 15 minutes. As Lowes did not come out, Bailey, thinking something was wrong, went a little way down the headways and shouted but got no answer. He said the atmosphere was very thick from the explosive fumes. As he proceeded further in he heard moans and shortly afterwards found Lowes lying near the bottom canch shot in the inside bord. The shotfirer appeared to be injured and had a large stone lying on his chest. Without making any reference to the accident Lowes said, " I'm done." Bailey cleared the stone off Lowes and tried to drag him out to the fresh air but finding he could not do so he ran for assistance.
The nearest point at which men were working was the big landing on the 5th West going bord about 1,260 yards away. Here he met a rolleywayman, named John Thomas Reay and some pony drivers, William Malcolm, Joseph Taylor andLawrence Aspinall, all of whom went back with him. After they left, another lad on the big landing communicated by telephone to the surface and the undermanager instructed a back overman, Robert Glendenning, also to go in and render assistance.
When Reay and the pony drivers reached the scene of the accident, unsuspecting any danger from the smoke, they commenced to lift Lowes on to a bogie and whilst doing so they all collapsed and were unable to get out, with the exception of Reay who managed to crawl out. By this time it must have been nearly o'clock, or one hour after the accident.
Glendenning organized the second rescue party which consisted of Samuel Hughff and John Kenny (hewers from another seam) with Sydney Purvis and John Thomas Baker (pit bottom lads). When the party arrived near the scene of the accident they found Reay — who had crawled out — in a state of collapse but conscious. Reay told them to hurry up as the lads were in the smoke with Lowes.
Glendenning, Kenny and Hughff tied wet handkerchiefs over their mouths and after going a short distance in the 2nd inside left headways they came across Herbert Bailey who was taken out to the fresh air. When Kenny was going in a second time he collapsed and was carried out by Hughff and Glendenning.
Hughff and Purvis then rescued the lad Aspinall who was unconscious and lying on his face just inside where Bailey had been found. Hughif then collapsed.
Glendenning supported by Baker then went in and found Malcolm lying face downward in water. He was apparently dead and was taken out. Glendenning went in again and found Lowes who appeared to be dead, and a little further inbye the lad Taylor, also dead. As Glendenning was carrying Taylor out he partially collapsed over the body of Lowes but managed to crawl out. By this time further help had arrived and Glendenning who had recovered somewhat went in again and helped to bring out the bodies of Lowes and Taylor. Glendenning then completely collapsed and was carried outbye unconscious. All subsequently revived excepting Lowes, Taylor and Malcolm who were dead. It was about 6 p.m. before the rescue work was completed.
The bodies were examined on the surface by a doctor who stated that all three deaths were due to carbon monoxide poisoning. Lowes was undoubtedly injured in the first instance by flying debris from shotfiring and this made it impossible for him to get out into the fresh air, but the subsequent happenings were directly due to an inadequate supply of air reaching the headways so as to clear or render harmless the fumes in a reasonable time. The headways were dangerous to life for over 2 hours after blasting operations.
... arrangements for ventilating the district were extremely crude and could never have received the thoughtful consideration of the management. The intake and return airways to and from the district were within a few yards of each other and were separated only by a single canvas sheet. The air current was supposed to travel up the No. 1 outside left headways and through the third bord into the first inside left headways. The third bord airway was so small that it could not be travelled. A new airway was in course of construction skirting the top of the first bord, but this had not holed through. The airway " XY " was the only intake connection to the headways where the accident occurred and this was rendered ineffective as an airway by the fact that the canvas door near the bottom of the first inside left headways was missing altogether. The airway "XY " measured at the inbye end only 1ft. 6ins, by 10ins, and about the same at the outbye end.
Owing to the absence of the canvas door on the first inside left headways, the little air there was in the district would take the course shown by the firm arrows, instead of the proper course shown by the dotted arrows.
The bravery of the rescue parties was of a very high order and was acknowledged by H.M. the King. Further details are given in Section V of this report.
By your direction proceedings were taken against the Agent, Manager and Undermanager for certain alleged breaches of the Coal Mines Act and General Regulations made thereunder and convictions were recorded. Particulars of these are given in Appendix I of this report.
The scene of the accident was in the 6th West District of the Victoria Seam situated about 1½ miles inbye the entrances to the mine. The Victoria Seam was about 1ft. 4ins. thick with a blue metal roof and a hard fireclay floor. The seam was worked on the bord and pillar system with pillars 33 by 22 yard centres.
The coal was hand got with the aid of explosives and 6 yards of coal won out as the bords and walls advanced in the solid. The tub roads were carried forward by blasting up about 2ft. 6ins. of the bottom canch for a width of about 5ft. The roof was not shot down.
Open lights were in use throughout the mine, firedamp being unknown. The explosive used for blasting in coal and canches was Arctic Gelignite No. 2 fired with gutta percha fuse and No, 6 detonators.
For some considerable time before the accident no artificial means were used for ventilating the workings. The intakes were by means of drifts, the return being the Lintz Anna shaft. The difference in level between the drift entrances and shaft top was about 500 feet. Investigation following the accident showed that very little air was circulating in the mine; anemometer readings could not be obtained in the main intake airway and smoke tests indicated that the air was nearly stagnant. A ventilating fan was put into use at the Lintz Anna shaft after the accident.
One shift only per day was worked, the workmen leaving the surface at 8 a.m., returning at about 3.30 p.m.
On the day of the accident a deputy had examined the 6th West District before the workmen entered it; he also made another inspection during the shift. At about 1 p.m. another deputy named Richard Lowes, who also acted as shotfirer, took charge of the district, his duties being to see all persons out and then to fire shots. No shots were fired during the working shift.
After the men had left the district on the afternoon of the accident Lowes, accompanied by a lad named Herbert Bailey, (14 years of age), commenced to fire shots at the return end of the district and at about 4 p.m. he reached the 2nd inside left headways... At the face of the headways (or wall) two shotholes in the coal were ready for firing and in the inside bord off the headways — one hole in the coal and another in the bottom canch. The holes were thought to be about 6ft. deep and although there was no evidence to show exactly how much explosive was used, it appears to have been customary to put about one pound in each hole.
When the four shots were ready for firing the lad Bailey — acting upon instructions from Lowes — proceeded to the 6th west going bord to take shelter — near A (see sketch). Bailey said he heard the four shots explode and afterwards waited about 15 minutes. As Lowes did not come out, Bailey, thinking something was wrong, went a little way down the headways and shouted but got no answer. He said the atmosphere was very thick from the explosive fumes. As he proceeded further in he heard moans and shortly afterwards found Lowes lying near the bottom canch shot in the inside bord. The shotfirer appeared to be injured and had a large stone lying on his chest. Without making any reference to the accident Lowes said, " I'm done." Bailey cleared the stone off Lowes and tried to drag him out to the fresh air but finding he could not do so he ran for assistance.
The nearest point at which men were working was the big landing on the 5th West going bord about 1,260 yards away. Here he met a rolleywayman, named John Thomas Reay and some pony drivers, William Malcolm, Joseph Taylor andLawrence Aspinall, all of whom went back with him. After they left, another lad on the big landing communicated by telephone to the surface and the undermanager instructed a back overman, Robert Glendenning, also to go in and render assistance.
When Reay and the pony drivers reached the scene of the accident, unsuspecting any danger from the smoke, they commenced to lift Lowes on to a bogie and whilst doing so they all collapsed and were unable to get out, with the exception of Reay who managed to crawl out. By this time it must have been nearly o'clock, or one hour after the accident.
Glendenning organized the second rescue party which consisted of Samuel Hughff and John Kenny (hewers from another seam) with Sydney Purvis and John Thomas Baker (pit bottom lads). When the party arrived near the scene of the accident they found Reay — who had crawled out — in a state of collapse but conscious. Reay told them to hurry up as the lads were in the smoke with Lowes.
Glendenning, Kenny and Hughff tied wet handkerchiefs over their mouths and after going a short distance in the 2nd inside left headways they came across Herbert Bailey who was taken out to the fresh air. When Kenny was going in a second time he collapsed and was carried out by Hughff and Glendenning.
Hughff and Purvis then rescued the lad Aspinall who was unconscious and lying on his face just inside where Bailey had been found. Hughif then collapsed.
Glendenning supported by Baker then went in and found Malcolm lying face downward in water. He was apparently dead and was taken out. Glendenning went in again and found Lowes who appeared to be dead, and a little further inbye the lad Taylor, also dead. As Glendenning was carrying Taylor out he partially collapsed over the body of Lowes but managed to crawl out. By this time further help had arrived and Glendenning who had recovered somewhat went in again and helped to bring out the bodies of Lowes and Taylor. Glendenning then completely collapsed and was carried outbye unconscious. All subsequently revived excepting Lowes, Taylor and Malcolm who were dead. It was about 6 p.m. before the rescue work was completed.
The bodies were examined on the surface by a doctor who stated that all three deaths were due to carbon monoxide poisoning. Lowes was undoubtedly injured in the first instance by flying debris from shotfiring and this made it impossible for him to get out into the fresh air, but the subsequent happenings were directly due to an inadequate supply of air reaching the headways so as to clear or render harmless the fumes in a reasonable time. The headways were dangerous to life for over 2 hours after blasting operations.
... arrangements for ventilating the district were extremely crude and could never have received the thoughtful consideration of the management. The intake and return airways to and from the district were within a few yards of each other and were separated only by a single canvas sheet. The air current was supposed to travel up the No. 1 outside left headways and through the third bord into the first inside left headways. The third bord airway was so small that it could not be travelled. A new airway was in course of construction skirting the top of the first bord, but this had not holed through. The airway " XY " was the only intake connection to the headways where the accident occurred and this was rendered ineffective as an airway by the fact that the canvas door near the bottom of the first inside left headways was missing altogether. The airway "XY " measured at the inbye end only 1ft. 6ins, by 10ins, and about the same at the outbye end.
Owing to the absence of the canvas door on the first inside left headways, the little air there was in the district would take the course shown by the firm arrows, instead of the proper course shown by the dotted arrows.
The bravery of the rescue parties was of a very high order and was acknowledged by H.M. the King. Further details are given in Section V of this report.
By your direction proceedings were taken against the Agent, Manager and Undermanager for certain alleged breaches of the Coal Mines Act and General Regulations made thereunder and convictions were recorded. Particulars of these are given in Appendix I of this report.